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Abstract. Alloy is a formal modeling language based on first-order re-
lational logic, with no native support for specifying reactive systems. We
propose an extension of Alloy to allow the specification of temporal for-
mulas using LTL, and show how they can be verified by bounded model
checking with the Alloy Analyzer.
1 Introduction
Alloy is a formal modeling language based on first-order relational logic [5]. Its
Analyzer enables model validation and verification by translation to off-the-shelf
SAT solvers. Alloy’s logic is quite generic and does not commit to a particular
specification style. In particular, there is no predefined way to specify and verify
reactive systems, and several idioms and extensions have been proposed to ad-
dress this issue. However, it is rather cumbersome and error-prone to specify and
verify temporal properties with such idioms. In this paper we propose the usage
of standard Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) to specify reactive systems in Alloy,
and show how bounded model checking can be performed with its Analyzer, by
resorting to the technique first proposed by Biere et al [1].
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 shows how reactive systems and
temporal properties can be specified and verified using Alloy and its Analyzer.
Section 3 discusses how such properties can be specified more easily in LTL and
then translated to Alloy, avoiding some of the potential problems pointed out in
the previous section. Finally, we discuss some related work in Section 4.
2 Verifying reactive systems in Alloy
In Alloy, a signature represents a set of atoms. An atom is a unity with three
fundamental properties: it is indivisible, immutable and uninterpreted. A signa-
ture declaration can introduce fields, sets of tuples of atoms capturing relations
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open util/ordering[State]
sig State {}
sig Message { to, from : one Partition }
sig Channel { messages : Message set -> State }
sig Partition { port : one Channel, pifp : set Partition }
fact NoSharedChannels { all c : Channel | lone port.c }
pred send [m : Message, s,s’ : State] { ... }
pred receive [m : Message, s,s’ : State] { ... }
pred transfer [m : Message, s,s’ : State] {
m in m.from.port.messages.s and m.to in (m.from).pifp
messages.s’ = messages.s - m.from.port->m + m.to.port->m
}
fact Init { no Channel.messages.first }
fact Trans { all s : State, s’ : s.next |
some m : Message | send[m,s,s’] or receive[m,s,s’] or transfer[m,s,s’]
}
Fig. 1. A PIFP specification in Alloy.
between the enclosing signature and others. Model constraints are defined by
facts. Assertions express properties that are expected to hold as consequence
of the stated facts. Commands are instructions to perform particular analysis.
Alloy provides two commands: run, that instructs the Analyzer to search for an
instance satisfying a given formula, and check, that attempts to contradict a
formula by searching for a counterexample.
Since fields are immutable, to capture the dynamics of a state transition sys-
tem a special signature whose atoms denote the possible states must be declared.
Without loss of generality, we will denote this signature as State. Every field
specifying a mutable relation must then include State as one of the signatures
it relates. There are two typical Alloy idioms to declare such mutable fields:
declare them all inside State, or add State as the last column in every mutable
field declaration. The former idiom is known as global state, since all mutable
fields are grouped together, while the latter is known as local state, since mutable
fields are declared in the same signature as non-mutable ones of similar type.
Figure 1 presents an example of an Alloy model conforming to the local state
idiom. It is a simplified model of the Partition Information Flow Policy (PIFP)
of a Secure Partitioning Kernel. Essentially, the PIFP statically defines which
information flows (triggered by message passing) are authorized between parti-
tions. Signature Message declares the fields to and fom, capturing its destination
and source Partition, respectively. Communication is done via channels, here
simplified to contain sets of messages. Obviously, the messages contained in a
channel vary over time. As such, signature Channel declares a mutable rela-
tion messages, that associates each channel with the set of its messages in each
state. Signature Partition declares two binary relations: port, denoting the
channel used by the partition to communicate, and pifp, that captures to which
partitions it is authorized to send messages.
In Alloy everything is a relation. For example, sets are unary relations and
variables are just unary singleton relations. As such, relational operators (in par-
ticular the dot join composition) can be used for various purposes. For example,
in the fact NoSharedChannels the relational expression port.c denotes the set
of partitions connected to port c. Multiplicities are also used in several contexts
to constrain or check the cardinality of a relation. For example, in the same fact,
multiplicity lone ensures that each channel is the port of at most one partition.
An operation can be specified using a predicate pred op[...,s,s’:State]
specifying when does op hold between the given pre- and post-states: to access
the value of a mutable field in the pre-state (or post-state) it suffices to com-
pose it with s (respectively s’). Our model declares three operations: send and
receive message (whose specifications are omitted due to space limitations),
and transfermessage between partitions. The send operation just deposits the
message in the sending partition port – the transfer operation is executed by
the kernel and is the one responsible to enforce the PIFP. Inside an operation, a
formula that does not refer s’ can be seen as a pre-condition. Otherwise it is a
post-condition. For example, m in m.from.port.messages.s is a pre-condition
to transfer, requiring m to be in the port of the source partition prior to its exe-
cution. Notice that frame conditions, specifying which mutable relations remain
unchanged, should be stated explicitly in each operation.
To specify temporal properties we need to model execution traces. A typical
Alloy idiom for representing finite prefixes of traces is to impose a total ordering
on signature State (by including the parameterized module util/ordering)
and force every pair of consecutive states to be related by one of the operations
(see fact Trans). Inside module util/ordering, the total order is defined by
the binary relation next, together with its first and last states. The initial
state of our example, where all channels are empty, is constrained by fact Init.
A desirable safety property states that the port of every partition only contains
messages sent from authorized partitions:
assert Safety { all p : Partition, m : Message | all s : State |
m.to = p and m in p.port.messages.s implies p in m.from.pifp
}
Model checking this assertion with the Alloy Analyzer yields a counter-
example: every partition can send a message to itself, even if not allowed by
the PIFP. To correct this problem we can, for example, add to our model the
fact all p:Partition | p in p.pifp, stating that all partitions should be al-
lowed to send messages to themselves. Non-invariant temporal assertions can
also be expressed with this idiom, but the complexity of the formulas and ex-
pertise required by the modeler increases substantially. Consider, for example
the liveness property stating that all authorized messages are eventually trans-
ferred to the destination. At first glance, it could be specified as follows (using
transitive closure to access the successors of a given state):
assert Liveness { all p : Partition, m : Message |
all s : State | m in p.port.messages.s and m.to in p.pifp implies
some s’ : s.*next | m in m.to.port.messages.s’
}
A simple (but artificial) way to ensure Liveness in this model is to disallow
message sending while there are still pending messages to transfer. This could be
done by adding the pre-condition no Channel.messages.s to operation send.
However, even with such pre-condition, model-checking assertion Liveness with
the Alloy Analyzer yields a false counter-example, where a message is sent in the
last state of the trace prefix. In fact, if we consider only finite prefixes of execution
traces, it is almost always possible to produce a false counter-example to a
liveness property. This problem is well-known in the bounded model-checking
community, and the solution, first proposed in [1], is to only consider as (true)
counter-examples to such properties prefixes of traces containing a back loop in
the last state, i.e., those that actually model infinite execution traces. It is easy to
define a parameterized trace module1, that adapts util/ordering to specify
potential infinite traces instead of total orders, by allowing such back loop in
the last state. Module trace also defines a predicate infinite that checks if
the loop is present in a trace instance: if so, next always assigns a successor to
every state, thus modeling an infinite trace. For convenience a dual predicate
finite is also defined. By replacing open util/ordering[State] with open
trace[State], the above liveness property can now be correctly specified (and
verified) as follows:
assert Liveness { all p : Partition, m : Message |
all s : State | m in p.port.messages.s and m.to in p.pifp implies
finite or some s’ : s.*next | m in m.to.port.messages.s’
}
3 Embedding LTL formulas in Alloy
As seen in the previous section, although we can specify and verify (by bounded
model checking) temporal properties in standard Alloy, it is a rather tricky and
error-prone task, in particular since the user must be careful about where to
check for finitude of trace prefixes. As such, we propose that, instead of using
explicit quantifiers over the states in a trace, such properties be expressed using
the standard LTL operators: X for next, G for always, F for eventually, U for until,
and R for release. For example, the above temporal properties could be specified
as follows:
assert Safety { all p : Partition, m : Message |
G (m.to = p and m in p.port.messages implies p in m.from.pifp)
}
1 Available at http://www.di.uminho.pt/~mac/Publications/trace.als.
vX φws ” some s.next and vφws.next
vG φws ” infinite and all s
1 : s.*next | vφw
s
1
vF φws ” some s
1 : s.*next | vφw
s
1
vφ U ψws ” some s
1 : s.*next | vψw
s
1 and all s2 : s.*next & ^next.s1 | vφw
s
2
vφ R ψws ” vG ψws or some s
1 : s.*next | vφw
s
1 and all s2 : s.*next & *next.s1 | vψw
s
2
vnot φws ” not vφws vΦ . Ψws ” vΦws . vΨws
vφ and ψws ” vφws and vψws vΦ & Ψws ” vΦws & vΨws
vφ or ψws ” vφws or vψws vΦ + Ψws ” vΦws + vΨws
vall x : Φ | φws ” all x : vΦws | vφws vΦ -> Ψws ” vΦws -> vΨws
vsome x : Φ | φws ” some x : vΦws | vφws v*Φws ” *vΦws
vΦ in Ψws ” vΦws in vΨws vnonews ” none
vxws ”
$&
%
x.s if x is the id of a mutable field declared with the local state idiom
s.x if x is the id of a mutable field declared with the global state idiom
x otherwise (i.e., a variable or the id of an immutable field)
Fig. 2. Embedding of temporal formulas.
assert Liveness { all p : Partition, m : Message |
G (m in p.port.messages and m.to in p.pifp implies
F (m in m.to.port.messages))
}
Assuming traces are specified with module trace, the embedding of LTL into
Alloy can be done via an (almost) direct encoding of the translation proposed
by Biere et al. [1] (for bounded model checking of LTL with a SAT solver).
Formally, a formula φ occurring in a fact or run command should be replaced by
vNNF pφqwfirst, where vφws is the embedding function defined in Figure 2, and
NNF pφq is the well-known transformation that converts formula φ to Negation
Normal Form (where all negations appear only in front of atomic formulas).
When finding a model for G φ, only prefixes capturing infinite traces should
be considered, thus assuring that φ is not violated further down the trace. As
clarified in [1], conversion to NNF is necessary since in the bounded semantics of
LTL the duality of G and F no longer hold. The embedding of logic and relational
operators is trivial, and thus only a representative subset of Alloy’s logic is
presented. A formula φ occurring in an assertion or check command should be
replaced by not vNNF pnot φqwfirst. Since assertions in check commands are
negated in order to find counter-examples, the outermost negation ensures they
still remain in NNF.
Note that, to improve efficiency (and likewise to util/ordering), when the
trace module is imported the scope of the parameter signature is interpreted as
an exact scope. This means that trace prefixes are bounded to be of size equal
to the scope of the State signature. Thus, to perform bounded model checking
of an assertion, the user should manually increase the scope of State one unit
at a time up to the desired bound.
4 Related work
Several extensions of Alloy to deal with dynamic behavior have been proposed.
DynAlloy [3] proposes an Alloy variant that allows the specification of properties
over execution traces using a formalism inspired by dynamic logic. Imperative
Alloy [6] proposes a more minimal extension to the language, with a simple
semantics by means of an embedding to standard Alloy. Unfortunately, in both
these works the verification of liveness properties may yield spurious counter-
examples, similar to the one presented in Section 2.
One of the advantages of our approach is that reactive systems can be spec-
ified declaratively using Alloy’s relational logic, as opposed to traditional model
checkers where transitions must be specified imperatively. Chang and Jackson [2]
proposed a BDD-based model checker for declarative models specified with rela-
tional logic enhanced with CTL temporal formulas. The current proposal shows
how the Alloy Analyzer can directly be used to perform bounded model checking
of temporal formulas without the need for a new tool.
Recently, Vakili and Day [7] showed how CTL formulas with fairness con-
straints can be model checked in Alloy, by using the encoding to first order
logic with transitive closure first proposed by Immerman and Vardi [4]. Their
technique performs full model checking on state transition systems specified
declaratively, but bounded to have at most the number of states specified in
the scope. This non-standard form of bounded model checking can yield non-
intuitive results in many application scenarios, or even prevent verification at
all if the the specification cannot be satisfied by a transition system that fits in
the (necessarily small) scope of State. Moreover, instead of proposing an Alloy
extension, CTL formulas are expressed using library functions that compute the
set of states where the formula holds. This leads to unintuitive specifications,
since the user is then forced to use relational operators to combine formulas
instead of the standard logical connectives.
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